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STATEMENT OF APPELLANT JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant 
to § 78-2-2(3) and (4) Utah Code Ann. 1996, as amended. 
1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I. Whether the Trial Court Erred by Denying Plaintiff#s 
Motion for a New Trial Based on the Jury's Inconsistent 
and Completely Incomprehensible Answers to the Special 
Interrogatories 
Standard of Appellate Review: the Appellate Court reviews a 
trial court's conclusions of law for correctness, granting no 
deference to the trial judge's legal determinations. State v. 
Pena, 869 P. 2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
The judgment on jury verdict was entered by the Court on 
January 13, 1999. Plaintiff-Appellant, Rae Lyn Schwartz 
("Schwartz") filed a Motion for a New Trial on January 25, 1999. 
R. 273-74. This issue was preserved in the trial court by 
Schwartz's timely filing of a motion for a new trial. 
II. Whether the Trial Court Erred by Allowing into Evidence 
Hearsay Statements Through the Testimony of a Police 
Officer Where No Exception to the Hearsay Rule Applied 
Standard of Appellate review: the Appellate Court reviews a 
trial court's conclusions of law for correctness, granting no 
deference to the trial judge's legal determination. State v. 
Pena, 869 P. 2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
At the time of trial, counsel for Schwartz objected to the 
statement of Erica B. Wolfe and ^Carolyn" as hearsay. No viable 
exception to the hearsay rule was provided by the defendant-
appellee, David Benzow pursuant to the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
(Transcript "T." 251:16-25). 
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III. Whether the Trial Court Erred by Failing to Instruct the 
Jury That Passing on a Single Lane Road with a Double 
Yellow Line Is a Violation of Utah Law 
Standard of Appellate Review: the Appellate Courts review a 
trial court's conclusions of law for correctness, granting no 
deference to the trial judge's legal determination. State v. 
Pena, 869 P. 2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
During the time of trial, counsel for Schwartz requested a 
jury instruction that passing is prohibited on a single lane road 
with a double yellow line. The trial court judge did not permit 
Schwartz's proposed jury instruction. (T. 313:1-16). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was brought by plaintiff-appellant Rae Lyn 
Schwartz ("Schwartz"). Schwartz was riding her bicycle on or about 
June 4, 1995 near Cedar City, Utah when she was involved in an 
accident with a yellow Jeep Wrangler. R. 2-5. On July 2, 1997 
Schwartz filed a Complaint in the Fifth Judicial District for the 
State of Utah against Benzow. R. 2-5. The trial occurred on 
November 18, 1998 and November 19, 1998. R. 319-320. The jury 
returned a verdict of no cause of action on November 19, 1998 with 
glaring inconsistencies. R. 264-267. On January 13, 1999 the trial 
court judge entered Judgment on Jury Verdict. R. 270-272. On 
January 26, 1999 Schwartz filed a Motion for a New Trial. R. 272-
274. On March 11, 1999 Judge Robert T. Braithwaite entered an 
Order denying Schwartz's Motion for a New Trial. R. 297-299. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The driver of the yellow Jeep Wrangler, defendant-appellee, 
David Benzow ("Benzow") passed Schwartz on her bicycle while on 
State Road 14, a single lane road in both directions with a double 
yellow line between traffic lanes, T. 224. Schwartz was traveling 
down hill at approximately 20 to 25 miles'" per hour. T. 113-114. 
Benzow admits he passed Schwartz and the group of bicyclists 
accompanying her immediately prior to the accident. T. 216-218. 
Schwartz testified at trial that Benzow slowed down as he passed 
her bicycle and bumped her handlebars, causing Schwartz to lose her 
balance and fall. T. 117. As a result of the accident, Schwartz 
suffered multiple abrasions to her face, legs and arms, including 
permanent scars and sustained severe damage to her teeth. T. 123-
126. 
The basis of Schwartz's motion for a new trial was the blatant 
inconsistencies in the verdict sheet returned by the jury on 
November 19, 1998. R. 275-278. The jury found that Benzow was not 
negligent in the accident involving Schwartz. However, the jury 
found Benzow was a proximate cause or contributing proximate cause 
to Schwartz's injuries. Next, the jury found that Schwartz was not 
negligent; however, the jury found that Schwartz was a proximate 
cause of her own injuries. Lastly, despite the findings that 
neither party was negligent, the jury, in answering jury 
interrogatory #5, attributed negligence to both Schwartz and Benzow 
in the amount of 50% each. R. 264-267. 
In addition, during the trial, a police officer testified 
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about hearsay statements made by purported witnesses to the 
accident. T. 252-254. Counsel for Schwartz objected to the 
officer's testimony and no applicable exception to the hearsay rule 
was provided. T. 252-253. Nonetheless, the trial judge permitted 
the testimony. T. 252. The Court's ruling was critical because the 
hearsay statements of the witnesses were the only purported 
evidence from non-parties which supported the defendant. 
Finally, during the trial, Schwartz requested a jury 
instruction stating that passing on a single lane road with a 
double yellow line is a violation of Utah law. T. 311-313. The 
judge refused to give this instruction to the jury. T. 313. 
Schwartz presents the three above issues for review on appeal. 
6 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The special verdict form returned by the jury was confusing 
and incomprehensible. The answers to the special interrogatories 
were inconsistent and did not provide a determination that could be 
read with any certainty. In particular, the jury found that 
neither party was negligent, but both parties proximately caused 
the accident. Furthermore, on the one hand the jury found neither 
party negligent, while on the other hand they assessed 50% 
negligence to both parties. 
Based upon the jury's obvious inconsistencies, Schwartz moved 
for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict was defective. The 
trial judge's denial of Schwartz's motion should be reversed and a 
new trial granted. 
During the trial, Benzow called Officer Bigler to the stand as 
a witness. Officer Bigler testified about his conversations with 
two alleged witnesses to the accident. The officer's testimony 
constituted hearsay without any exception. Despite several 
objections by Schwartz's counsel, the trial judge permitted the 
testimony. Based upon the erroneous introduction into evidence of 
the officer's statements, Schwartz is entitled to a new trial. 
Finally, Benzow testified that immediately prior to passing 
Ms. Schwartz on her bicycle, he crossed the double yellow line. 
During the trial, counsel for Schwartz requested that the jury be 
instructed with respect to no passing zones. The trial judge 
refused to provide such an instruction. The court's failure to 
instruct the jury with respect to the relevant statute was 
erroneous and Schwartz is entitled to a new trial. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
GRANTED BASED UPON THE INCOMPREHENSIBLE JURY VERDICT 
The trial court erred in denying Schwartz's Motion for a New 
Trial. Plaintiff's motion for a new trial was based upon the fact 
that the completed special verdict form returned by the jury was 
confusing, nonsensical and incomprehensible. R. 273-278. The 
answers given by the jury were completely inconsistent as it first 
found Benzow was not negligent, but then determined he was 50% 
negligent. The jury then found Schwartz was not negligent, but 
later determined she was 50% negligent. R. 264-267. The jury 
verdict form could not be read with any certainty or clarity. 
Schwartz presented this argument before the trial judge, who denied 
her motion for a new trial. R. 297-299. 
Specifically, the jury verdict form was answered as follows: 
1. Considering all of the evidence in this case, do 
you find from a preponderance of the evidence that 
the defendant David Benzow was negligent? 
ANSWER: No. 
2. Considering all the evidence in this case, do you 
find from a preponderance of the evidence that the 
negligence of the defendant David Benzow was either 
the sole proximate cause or a contributing 
proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries? 
ANSWER: Yes. 
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3. Considering all of the evidence in this case, do 
you find from a preponderance of evidence that 
plaintiff was negligent? 
ANSWER: No. 
4. Considering all of the evidence in this case, do 
you find from a preponderance of the evidence that 
the negligence of plaintiff Rae Lyn Schwartz was 
either the sole proximate cause or a contributing 
proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries? 
ANSWER: Yes. 
5. If you have answered "Yes" to either or both 
question 2 and/or 4 then, and only then, answer the 
following question: 
Assuming the combined negligence of the 
parties to total 100%, what percentage of that 
negligence is attributable to: 
a) David Benzow 50% 
b) Rae Lyn Schwartz 50% 
Total: 100% 
See Addendum and R. 264-267. 
It is readily apparent from the jury's responses to the 
special interrogatories that the jury verdict does not make sense. 
While the jury did not find either party negligent, they assessed 
50% negligence to both parties. Additionally, while the jury found 
neither party was negligent they also found both parties 
proximately caused the accident. These are inconsistent responses 
requiring a new trial. 
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Where a case is submitted to a jury on special verdicts, the 
trial court should grant a new trial when the jury verdict is 
incomprehensible and makes no sense. See, Moore v. Burton Lumber 
and Hardware Co., 631 P. 2d 865 (Utah 1981); see also. Van CIeve 
v. Betts, 559 P. 2d 1006, 1012 (Ct. App. Wash. 1977). 
A jury's answers to special interrogatories must be read 
harmoniously. Clearly, the jury verdict in this case contains 
obvious inconsistencies, confirms juror misunderstanding and 
confusion and cannot be read harmoniously. Schwartz is entitled to 
a new trial. 
Normally, a party is not permitted to move for a new trial on 
grounds that the verdict was defective, if it fails to take 
appropriate action before discharge of the jury. However, this 
rule does not apply when the verdict is so ambiguous, contradictory 
and illogical that it does not clearly indicate for whom the 
verdict is rendered and the verdict will leave the court and 
counsel in a position of having no alternative but to guess at what 
the jury intended. Bennion v. LeQrand Johnson Construction 
Company, 701 P. 2d 1078 (Utah 1985). Here, although counsel for 
Schwartz did not raise an objection at the conclusion of the trial, 
one is not necessary where the form is incomprehensible. In fact, 
counsel for Schwartz was not provided a copy of the completed jury 
form until after the jury was discharged. The only recourse 
provided to Schwartz was to file a motion for new trial, which was 
done on a timely basis. 
The trial court erred in not granting Schwartz's motion for a 
new trial. Judge Braithwaite's Order of March 11, 1999 denying 
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Schwartz a new trial should be reversed and Schwartz should be 
granted a new trial. 
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POINT II 
THE HEARSAY STATEMENT OF ERICA B. WOLFE AND 
CAROLYN SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED AT THE TRIAL 
Erica B. Wolfe was riding her bicycle immediately behind Rae 
Lyn Schwartz, just prior to the accident. Carolyn (last name 
unknown) was also a fellow bicyclist. Ms. Wolfe and Carolyn were 
allegedly witnesses to the accident involving Schwartz and the 
yellow Jeep Wrangler. The police officer investigating the 
accident, Jeffrey Bigler, interviewed Ms. Wolfe and Carolyn hours 
after the incident at the hospital. 
Officer Bigler was a witness for the defense and was prepared 
to testify at trial regarding his conversations with Ms. Wolfe and 
Carolyn. The officer was going to provide testimony based on, and 
in connection with, his police report. Specifically, the officer 
was going to testify that Ms. Wolfe told him that: 1. Ms. Wolfe was 
riding approximately twelve feet behind and one foot to the right 
of Schwartz; 2. Ms. Wolfe does not remember a Jeep passing 
Schwartz; and 3. Ms. Wolfe remembered that Schwartz went down on 
the road and Ms. Wolfe ran into her. He was going to testify that 
Carolyn told him that the defendant's Jeep was not near plaintiff 
when she fell. 
Prior to the presentation of Benzow's case in chief, counsel 
for Schwartz objected to Officer Bigler's testimony regarding 
Ms. Wolfe and Carolyn. T. 192:19-25. 'Specifically, James W. 
Jensen, counsel for Schwartz, argued in his in limine motion that 
Officer Bigler should not be permitted to testify about Ms. Wolfe's 
and Carolyn's statements because they were inadmissible hearsay. 
12 
T. 192:24-25. The Court denied the motion as premature. T. 198:4-
11. 
Thereafter, defendant called Officer Bigler to the stand and 
asked him about his conversation with Ms. Wolfe: 
Q. And did Ms. Wolfe describe the accident for 
you? 
A. Yes. She did. 
Q. What did she tell you about the accident? 
MR. JENSEN: Objection, Your Honor. Hearsay. T. 251:10-14. 
William Stegall, counsel for Benzow responded to the objection 
as follows: 
Yes, your Honor. First I think that this 
information was gathered by Trooper Bigler in 
the course of his investigation being done as 
part of his duties with the Utah Highway 
Patrol trooper that I believe is admissible 
under 802 -- 803-8. 
Additionally, it would be a statement made by 
an individual at or shortly after the event 
which transpired, and therefore would be 
admissible under the hearsay exception 
regarding statements made at or near the time 
of the event recorded. T.251:21-25. 
Counsel for Schwartz responded that the exceptions cited to by 
Mr. Stegall were inapplicable to this case and referred the court 
to the prior in limine motion. T. 252:2-5. Despite Mr. Jensen's 
objection, the trial judge permitted Officer Bigler to testify to 
the hearsay statement of Ms. Wolfe and Carblyn. T. 252:16-25. The 
sole basis for the court's decision was: "Okay. He's just asking 
the one question. I'm going to allow that question. He's not 
offering --." T. 252:11-12. No explanation or analysis was given by 
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the Court. To compound the error, while the trial court stated 
that only one question would be allowed, defense counsel was 
permitted to ask numerous questions which elicited damaging hearsay 
statements from the officer. Officer Bigler testified that Ms. 
Wolfe told him she was about twelve feet behind Schwartz 
immediately prior to the accident; she did not remember a Jeep 
passing Schwartz; and Schwartz just went down and Ms. Wolfe ran 
into her. T. 252:19-25 and 253:10-13. 
Pointedly, the officer was allowed to testify that another 
biker -- Carolyn -- told him at the hospital, hours after the 
accident, that she did not see the Jeep hit Schwartz as the Jeep 
was approximately 15 feet ahead of Schwartz when Schwartz went 
down. T. 253:14 to 254:3. 
The trial court erred by allowing Officer Bigler to testify to 
the hearsay statements of Ms. Wolfe and Carolyn. First, the 
exceptions relied upon by defendant are not applicable. Utah Rule 
of Evidence 803(8) has nothing to do with this case. See Addendum. 
The Rule relates to admission of records and recorded statements. 
Here, defendant did not seek to admit Officer Bigler's police 
report, rather, defendant only sought to have Officer Bigler 
testify to out of court statements of two alleged witnesses. 
Second, Utah Rule of Evidence 803(8) (C) is also not applicable. See 
Addendum. Again, that rule relates to admissibility of records. 
Here, records are not the issue. Finally, Officer Bigler spoke to 
Ms. Wolfe and Carolyn at the hospital hours after the accident. 
The witness statements were not contemporaneous to the accident and 
lack credibility. 
14 
Our case presents classic hearsay without an exception. By 
allowing the hearsay statements, Schwartz was denied the 
opportunity to cross examine Ms. Wolfe and Carolyn and attack, 
among other things, the reliability of the statements. Compounding 
the situation is that the hearsay statements of Ms. Wolfe and 
Carolyn were the only ^evidence" introduced at trial from a non-
party witness to the accident. The statements were the linchpin to 
defendant's defense. As a result of the foregoing, Schwartz is 
entitled to a new trial. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY INSTRUCT 
THE JURY REGARDING NO PASSING 
ZONES UNDER UTAH LAW 
During the trial, defendant Benzow testified that he passed 
Schwartz, a bicyclist, by traveling onto the other side of the road 
crossing the double yellow line. T. 224:9"-13. 
As a result, counsel for Schwartz requested a jury instruction 
which was labeled as plaintiff's instruction #22. R. 185-195. The 
proposed jury instruction cited directly from Utah Code Ann. § 41-
6-59, regarding no passing zones. Specifically, counsel for 
Schwartz requested that subsection 2 of § 41-6-59 be used. T. 
311:6-24. 
where signs or markers are in place to define 
a no passing zone under subsection 1, an 
operator may not drive on the left side of the 
road in a no passing zone or on the left side 
of any pavement striping design to mark the no 
passing zone throughout its length. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-59 (2); see Addendum. 
The double yellow lines constitute a "marker" as used in Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-59(2). See Addendum. Judge Braithwaite refused 
to instruct on #22. T. 313:14-16. Counsel for Schwartz objected to 
the judge's decision not to use plaintiff's proposed jury 
instruction #22. T. 313:20-22. 
Where there is evidence adduced to support a party's theory of 
the case, it is prejudicial and reversiHle error for the trial 
court to fail to instruct thereon. Walters v. Querry, 626 P. 2d 
455 (Utah 1981). Here, Schwartz's theory was that defendant 
crossed the yellow lines and struck Schwartz. It was critical for 
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the trial court to instruct the jury as to § 41-6-59. If properly 
instructed/ the jury would have been told that a violation of a 
statute is an inference of negligence. As a result, if the jury 
believed Benzow violated the statute, they could have found 
defendant negligent and returned a verdict for the plaintiffs. 
ChiIds v. Gonda, 972 P. 2d 425 (Utah 1998). The trial court's 
refusal to charge the jury as to § 41-6-59 was erroneous and 
Schwartz is entitled to a new trial. 
17 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Schwartz is entitled to a 
new trial. 
NAGEL RICE & DREIFUSS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
/ /. 
Dated: «'''-! ?5 
c:wp61data\schwartz\briefapp.uta 
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ADDENDUM 
rll.Ei) 
F , F T H DISTRICT COURT 
' 9 9 f?flH 1 1
 m i l 3 3 
William A. Stcgall, 3093 
KIDMAN & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Defendant 
6056 S. Fashion Square Drive, Suite 200 
Murray, UT 84107 
801-281-3788 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RAE LYN SCHWARTZ, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID BENZOW, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR 
OTHER RELIEF 
Civil No. 970500338 
Robert T. Braithwaite 
Plaintiffs motion for new trial or other relief dated January 25, 1999, was submitted 
for decision on February 22, 1999. The court reviewed plaintiff's motion and supporting 
memorandum and defendant's memorandum in opposition thereto. Upon the above and 
foregoing, and the court being fully advised in the premises and good cause appearing therefor: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs motion for new trial or other relief is 
* o 
denied. 
Dated this / / day of March, 1999. 
BY THE COURT: 
Robert T. Bralthwaite 
District Judge 
2 
029ft 
1
 'L-EZU 
DEPUTY CLERK ° W ^ 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RAE LYN SCHWARTZ, SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID BENZOW, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 970500338 
Judge Robert T. Braithwaite 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
Please answer questions 1 through 6 from a preponderance of the evidence. If you find 
the evidence preponderates in favor of the issue presented, answer "Yes." if you find the 
evidence is so equally balanced that you cannot determine a preponderance of the evidence, or 
if you find that the evidence preponderates against the issue presented, answer "No". Also, 
any damages assessed must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. 
1. Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you find from a preponderance 
of the evidence that defendant David Benzow was negligent? 
ANSWER: Yes No X 
2. Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you find from a preponderance 
of tne evidence that the negligence of the defendant David Benzow was either the sole 
proximate cause or a contributing proximate cause of plaintiff s injuries? 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
3. Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you find from a preponderance 
of the evidence that plaintiff was negligent? 
ANSWER: Yes No y( 
4. Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you find from a preponderance 
of the evidence that the negligence of plaintiff Rae Lyn Schwartz was either the sole proximate 
cause or a contributing proximate cause of plaintiff s injuries? 
ANSWER: Yes >C No 
5. If you have answered u Yes" to either or both Questions 2 and/or 4 then, and 
only then, answer the following question: 
Assuming the combined negligence of the parties to total 100%, what percentage of that 
negligence is attributable to: 
A. David Benzow fiO % 
B. Rae Lynn Schwartz S O % 
TOTAL: 100% 
6. If you have answered -u Yes" to Question 2 and you have attributed to defendant 
David Benzow more than 50% ot the total negligence, then, and only then, state the amount of 
damages, if any, sustained by plaintiff as a proximate result of plaintiff s injuries. If 
Question 2 was answered "No/ or if you have attributed to defendant David Benzow 50%^or 
less of the total negligence, then do not answer this question. 
A. Past Medical Expenses $ 
B. Future Medical Expenses • $ 
C. General Damages $ 
(pain and suffering, etc.) 
TOTAL: $ 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
If you have answered "Yes" to Question 2, and if you have attributed more than 50% 
of the total negligence to defendant David Benzow, then, and only then, answer question 7. 
Please answer Question 7 from clear and convincing evidence. If you find the evidence 
has reached a point where there remains no substantial doubt as to the truth or correctness of 
the conclusion based on the evidence, answer "Yes." If there is any substantial doubt as to the 
truth or correctness of the conclusion based On the evidence, answer "No." 
7. Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of 
defendant were a result of willful and malicious conduct or conduct that manifested a knowing 
and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of plaintiff? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
Dated this ) °\ day of November, 1998. 
Foreperson 
RULE 803 HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS: AVAILABILITY OF DECLARANT IMMATERIAL 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the 
declarant is available as a witness: 
(8) Public Records and Reports. 
Records, reports, statements, or data compilationsr in any 
form, or public offices or agencies, setting forth (A)v vthe 
activities of the office or agency, or_ (B) matters observed 
pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a 
duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters 
observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel, or 
(C) in civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in 
criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation 
made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of 
information or other circumstances indicate lack of 
trustworthiness. 
41-6-59. Signs and markings on roadway — No passing 
zones — Exceptions* 
(1) (a) The Department of Transportation and local authorities may deter-
mine those portions of any highway under their respective jurisdictions 
where overtaking and passing or driving on the left of the roadway is 
especially hazardous and may by appropriate signs or markings on the 
highway indicate the beginning and end of those zones. 
(b) When the signs or markings are in place and clearly visible to a 
reasonably observant person, every operator of a vehicle snali ooey the 
directions. 
(2) Where signs or markings are in place to define a no-passing zone under 
Subsection (i), an operator may not drive on the left side of the roadway 
within the no-passing zone or on the left side of any pavement striping de-
signed to mark the no-passing zone throughout its lengths. 
(3) This section does not apply to Subsection 41-5-53(l)(b) nor to the opera-
tor of a vehicle turning left onto or from an alley, private road, or driveway. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52. $ 49: C. IS4S, 
57*7-126; L. 1975, ch. 207. * 17; 197S. ch. 33, 
§ 13; 1987. ch. 138, i 58. 
